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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The issue in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee is whether, 
in a suit against a public school for sex discrimination, Title IX 
precludes constitutional claims for Equal Protection under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. This case arose from a kindergartner’s allegations that she was 
sexually harassed on the school bus by a third-grade student.1 When 
the school responded to her claims by offering to move the plaintiff to 
another bus, rather than moving the third-grade student who had 
committed the harassment, the student and her parents sued the 
School Committee and the superintendent.2 The plaintiffs state a 
claim against the School Committee under Title IX, an Equal 
Protection claim against the superintendent and the School 
Committee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and various state law claims 
against the superintendent and the School Committee.3 
The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims and state law claims,4 but denied the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the Title IX claim.5 After discovery, 
however, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment on the Title IX claim too.6 The plaintiff appealed the grant 
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of summary judgment of both the Title IX claim and the claims under 
section 1983.7 
The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Title 
IX claim because the school failed to show the deliberate indifference 
required to sustain a sexual harassment claim under Title IX.8 The 
First Circuit also affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the 
claims under section 1983, holding that the plaintiffs’ Title IX claims 
precluded the section 1983 claims.9 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to decide the issue of whether claims under Title IX 
preclude Equal Protection claims under section 1983.10 
II.  FACTS 
In February 2001, Jacqueline Fitzgerald, then a kindergarten 
student, told her parents that every time she wore a dress to school, 
an older student bullied her into lifting it while she was on the bus 
and that this bullying occurred two or three times each week.11  
Jacqueline eventually told her parents that the bully also had forced 
her to pull down her underwear and spread her legs.12 Jacqueline’s 
mother, Lisa Ryan Fitzgerald, immediately called the school’s 
principal, Frederick Scully, to inform the school of Jacqueline’s 
claims.13 Scully and the school system’s prevention specialist, Lynda 
Day, met with Jacqueline and her parents within hours of receiving 
Ms. Fitzgerald’s call.14 
Scully and Day arranged for Jacqueline to observe the children 
getting off the bus, and Jacqueline identified third-grader Briton 
Gleson as the perpetrator.15 Day questioned Gleson, the bus driver, 
and most of the children who rode the bus in the morning, but Day 
was unable to corroborate Jacqueline’s claims.16 Principal Scully 
concluded that the school could not take disciplinary measures 
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 10. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 128 S. Ct. 2903 (U.S. Jun 09, 2008) (NO. 07-1125) 
(mem.). 
 11. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 169 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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against Gleson.17 The police conducted a simultaneous investigation 
and found that there was not enough evidence to proceed criminally 
against Gleson either.18 
Without sufficient evidence to take disciplinary action against 
Gleson, the school offered to transfer Jacqueline to a different bus or 
to leave two empty rows of seats between the kindergartners and the 
older children.19 The Fitzgeralds rejected these solutions and 
suggested the school instead transfer Gleson to a different bus or 
place a monitor on the bus to watch the children.20 Superintendent 
Russell Dever rejected the Fitzgeralds’ proposals.21 
In April, 2002, the Fitzgeralds sued the Barnstable School 
Committee, which governed the elementary school, and 
Superintendent Dever in federal district court.22 The Fitzgeralds 
claimed that the Barnstable School Committee violated Title IX of 
the Education Act Amendments of 1972, and that both the school 
committee and Dever denied Jacqueline constitutional rights 
protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.23 The district court granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss the section 1983 claims, and, after 
discovery, granted the school committee’s motion for summary 
judgment on the Title IX claim.24 The Fitzgeralds appealed the 
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.25 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Title IX 
Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972 protects 
against sexual discrimination occurring within an educational 
institution that results in the denial of educational opportunities.26 The 
only remedy expressly provided by the statute is the denial of federal 
 
 17. Id. at 170. 
 18. Id. at 169–70. 
 19. Id. at 170. 
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 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”). 
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funds to the educational institution.27 There is, however, a judicially 
implied private right of action for individuals to sue an institution that 
violates the Title IX sex discrimination prohibition.28 This judicially 
implied private right allows plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief and 
pecuniary damages.29 
Under Title IX, educational institutions may be liable for one 
student’s sexual harassment of another student if the plaintiff can 
prove that: (1) the educational institution is subject to Title IX 
because it receives federal funding; (2) “severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive harassment occurred”; (3) “the harassment 
deprived . . . [the student] of educational opportunities or benefits”; 
(4) “the educational institution had actual knowledge of the 
harassment”; and (5) the harassment occurred or was made more 
likely to occur because of the institution’s deliberate indifference.30 
The institution’s response is considered “deliberate indifference” only 
if the response was “clearly unreasonable in light of the known 
circumstances.”31 
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
Section 1983 protects federal statutory and constitutional rights. 
The statute provides that: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit 
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .32 
Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment is one of the 
constitutional rights protected by section 1983.33 Section 1983, 
however, “cannot be used to enforce a statutory right when that 
statute’s remedial scheme is sufficiently comprehensive as to 
 
 27. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000). 
 28. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
 29. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992). 
 30. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 176 (1st Cir. 2007)(citing Porto v. 
Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 72–73 (1st Cir. 2007)). 
 31. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999). 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 33. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 221 (1988) (holding that a state court judge was 
liable for damages under section 1983 in an Equal Protection case that arose from the state 
court judge’s dismissal of a probation officer on account of her sex). 
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demonstrate Congress’s intent to limit the available remedies to those 
provided by the statute itself.”34 The purpose behind this exception is 
to prevent plaintiffs from using the remedies available under section 
1983 to circumvent the remedial limits that Congress has enacted in 
other statutes.35 Congress indicates its intent to limit remedies to those 
provided by a particular statute either by express provision or by 
“other specific evidence from the statute itself.”36 Whether the 
availability of a judicially implied remedy makes a statute’s remedial 
scheme sufficiently comprehensive is uncertain.37 
Currently, the Supreme Court has found only one instance in 
which a statutory claim precludes a section 1983 constitutional claim.38 
In Smith v. Robinson, the Court held that, because Congress intended 
the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) to be an exclusive 
remedial scheme, the EHA claim precluded a section 1983 
constitutional claim.39 The Court relied on both the provisions of the 
EHA and its legislative history in determining that Congress intended 
the remedial scheme of the EHA to be exclusive.40 
C. Court of Appeals’ Circuit Split 
The federal courts of appeals are split on the issue of whether a 
Title IX claim precludes an Equal Protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. The circuits that have held that Title IX precludes section 1983 
constitutional claims have done so because they construe Title IX’s 
 
 34. Fitzgerald, 504 F.3d at 176 (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea 
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1981)). 
 35. See id. (“This limitation ensures that plaintiffs cannot circumvent the idiosyncratic 
requirements of a particular remedial scheme by bringing a separate action to support the same 
right under section 1983.”). 
 36. Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987). 
 37. See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athl. Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 690–91 (6th Cir. 
2006) (stating that only statutes that contain “an explicit private remedy . . . [are] sufficiently 
comprehensive for us to infer that Congress intended the remedy to be exclusive.”). But see 
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1981) 
(holding that express remedies preclude suits for damages under section 1983 when sufficient 
express remedies exist to demonstrate that “Congress intended to foreclose implied private 
actions.”). 
 38. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984); see also Brief Amici Curiae of the American 
Civil Liberties Union and the National Women’s Law Center, et al. in Support of Petitioners at 
13, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable, No. 07-1125 (U.S. Aug. 29, 2008) (“Only once has the Court found 
any statute to preclude a plaintiff from seeking redress for constitutional violations through the 
traditional avenue of § 1983 and that decision, Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), is readily 
distinguishable.”) [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae of the ACLU & NWLC]. 
 39. Id. at 1013. 
 40. Id. at 1010–11. 
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remedial scheme as providing a complete and exclusive remedy. For 
example, in Boulahanis v. Board of Regents, a case involving the 
validity of a school’s elimination of its men’s soccer and wrestling 
teams, the Seventh Circuit held that Title IX preempted claims under 
42 U.S.C § 1983, even in suits against individual defendants who 
would not be liable under Title IX.41 This decision built on the court’s 
previous decision in Waid v. Merrill Area Public Schools in which the 
court held that, as a general principle, Title IX claims precluded 
constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983.42 The Boulahanis court 
based these holdings on its “interpretation of Title IX’s statutory 
scheme” and its understanding that Congress intended Title IX to 
supersede the use of 42 U.S.C § 1983 against both institutions and 
individuals accused of sexual discrimination in educational settings.43 
Similarly, in Bruneau v. South Kortright Central School District, a 
student-on-student sexual harassment case, the Second Circuit held 
that Title IX created a sufficient avenue for relief and therefore 
precluded suits under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for Equal Protection claims.44 
The Third Circuit held in Williams v. School District of Bethlehem, 
Pennsylvania, that a district court correctly dismissed a plaintiff’s 
section 1983 constitutional claims because Title IX subsumed these 
claims due to its comprehensive remedial scheme.45 
Other circuits have held that Title IX’s remedial scheme is 
sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate that Congress intended 
the scheme to be exclusive. Accordingly, these circuits have held that 
Title IX does not preclude section 1983 constitutional claims. 
In Kinman v. Omaha Public School District, a case in which a 
teacher had a sexual relationship with a student, the Eighth Circuit 
held that the plaintiff could not maintain a Title IX claim against the 
school because the school did not react to the relationship with 
deliberate indifference.46 Furthermore, the plaintiff could not maintain 
a Title IX claim against the teacher because Title IX does not provide 
for suits against individuals.47 The court held, however, that the 
 
 41. Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 42. Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F. 3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 43. Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 640. 
 44. Bruneau v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 756 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 45. Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168, 176 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 46. Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 47. Id. 
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plaintiff did have a cause of action against the teacher in his 
individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.48 
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit held in Seamons v. Snow that Title IX 
does not preempt constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
because plaintiffs raising section 1983 claims are exercising rights 
available under the constitution rather than attempting to circumvent 
Title IX’s statutory scheme.49 The Tenth Circuit also held that Title 
IX’s implied judicial private right of action does not suggest a 
comprehensive remedial scheme.50 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Seamons relied heavily on the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Lillard v. Shelby County Board of 
Education.51 The Sixth Circuit had distinguished Lillard from Smith v. 
Robinson by noting that Title IX and Equal Protection claims were 
not virtually identical and that the legislative history did not indicate 
that Congress intended Title IX to supplant other available 
remedies.52 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that because Congress did not 
intend Title IX to be an exclusive remedy, allowing constitutional 
remedies available under 42 U.S.C § 1983 would not amount to 
circumventing Title IX’s remedial scheme.53 
IV.  HOLDING 
In Fitzgerald v. Barnstable, the First Circuit held that Title IX does 
preclude constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983.54 The court 
explained that “a sufficiently comprehensive remedial scheme . . . may 
preclude constitutional claims that are virtually identical to those that 
could be brought under . . . [a statutory] regime.”55 The court first held 
that the Fitzgeralds’ Equal Protection claim was virtually identical to 
their Title IX claim, because they “offer[ed] no theory of liability 
under the Equal Protection Clause other than the defendants’ 
supposed failure to take adequate actions to prevent and/or 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 723–24 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 52. Id. at 723. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 179 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 55. Id. (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011 (1984)). 
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remediate the peer-on-peer harassment that Jacqueline 
experienced.”56 
The court then determined that Congress intended Title IX to 
preclude virtually identical constitutional claims, reasoning that the 
“comprehensiveness of Title IX’s remedial scheme—especially as 
embodied in its implied private right of action—indicates that 
Congress saw Title IX as the sole means of vindicating the 
constitutional right to be free from gender discrimination perpetrated 
by educational institutions.”57 The court drew comparisons with Smith 
v. Robinson, saying that in both cases the remedial scheme of the 
statute was sufficiently comprehensive to preclude constitutional 
claims that were virtually identical to claims brought under the 
statute.58 
The court added that the holding in Fitzgerald would still allow a 
plaintiff to bring simultaneous Title IX and section 1983 claims 
against an individual defendant, but only if the plaintiff alleges that 
the defendant committed an “independent wrong, separate and apart 
from the wrong asserted against the educational institution.”59 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The First Circuit’s decision in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable is 
problematic because it assumes that a judicially implied remedy 
reflects Congress’s intent, it ignores the differences between 
Fitzgerald and Smith, and it forecloses a means of protecting 
constitutional rights that are otherwise unprotected. 
The First Circuit held that the remedial scheme of Title IX is 
sufficiently comprehensive to preclude the Equal Protection claim, 
indicating that Congress intended Title IX to be “the sole means of 
vindicating the constitutional right to be free from gender 
discrimination perpetrated by educational institutions.”60 The court 
emphasized that the availability of the private right of action is what 
makes Title IX’s remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to 
indicate Congress’s intent that Title IX preclude section 1983 claims.61 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 180. 
 60. Id. at 179. 
 61. Id. 
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This private right of action, however, was judicially implied, rather 
than expressly stated in the statute.62 The First Circuit acknowledged 
that Congress may demonstrate its intent that a remedial scheme be 
exclusive by “express provision or other specific evidence from the 
statute itself,” including legislative history.63 The court then pointed 
out that the Supreme Court has held, based on the legislative history 
of Title IX, that Congress intended to create a private right of action.64 
What the First Circuit missed, however, is that legislative history 
supporting Congress’s intent to create a private right of action is not 
the same as legislative history supporting Congress’s intent to create 
an exclusive remedial scheme. In order to determine Congress’s intent 
for Title IX to be the sole means of vindicating the constitutional right 
to Equal Protection, the court should have considered “specific 
evidence” of this intent from legislative history, rather than refer to 
the Supreme Court’s previous consideration of legislative history 
regarding the creation of a private right of action. In fact, the implicit 
nature of the remedy might suggest that Congress did not intend Title 
IX to be the exclusive remedial scheme, because if Congress did 
intend the statute to be the exclusive source of remedies, it is likely 
that it would state each remedy expressly.65 By expressly stating each 
remedy, Congress could have avoided the risk that the judiciary would 
fail to imply a remedy.66 
In the Fitzgerald decision, the First Circuit made frequent 
comparisons to Smith v. Robinson, noting the “striking” parallel 
between the two cases.67 The EHA, however, differs from Title IX in 
that it expressly created an enforceable private right to an education 
whereas the language of Title IX created no such right.68 Moreover, 
the Court in Smith held that “both the provisions of the [EHA] and 
its legislative history indicate that Congress intended handicapped 
children with constitutional claims to a free appropriate public 
education to pursue those claims through the carefully tailored 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 177. 
 64. Id. (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694–703 (1979)). 
 65. See Brief for Petitioners at 27, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable, No. 07-1125 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2008) 
(“[I]t is hard to imagine that Congress intended Title IX to preclude invocation of section 1983 
while leaving it to the courts through the implication of a private remedy to establish the 
contours of and limits on the Title IX private right of action.”). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Fitzgerald, 504 F.3d at 179. 
 68. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 65, at 27. 
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administrative and judicial mechanism set out in the statute.”69 In 
deciding that Title IX precludes section 1983 constitutional claims, 
however, the First Circuit did not consider the legislative history 
regarding Congress’s intent to make Title IX an exclusive source of 
remedies, and therefore the First Circuit’s reliance on Smith as 
precedent was inexact.70 
Furthermore, although Smith demonstrates the Court’s willingness 
to find that a constitutional claim is precluded by a statute with a 
sufficiently comprehensive remedial scheme, most precedent 
demonstrates the Court’s reluctance to allow a later-enacted statute 
to disturb claims previously available under section 1983.71 For 
instance, the Court has “confirmed consistently” that Title VII of the 
Education Act, which protects against racial discrimination in schools, 
does not preclude constitutional claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981.72 
Similarly, the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which contained fair housing 
provisions, “did not implicitly displace ‘the property rights guaranteed 
by the Civil Rights Act of 1866.’”73 
Another problem with the Fitzgerald decision is that it has the 
potential to preclude the protection of constitutional rights. Title IX 
applies only to institutions receiving federal funding, but the receipt 
of federal funds is voluntary, so a school could avoid Title IX liability 
by declining to receive funding.74 The Equal Protection Clause, in 
contrast, applies to all state actors, regardless of whether they receive 
federal funding.75 
Additionally, Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause do not 
protect exactly the same substantive rights, and thus if Title IX 
precludes Equal Protection claims based on section 1983, some claims 
covered by the Equal Protection Clause may no longer be protected.76 
For example, Title IX makes schools liable for deliberate indifference 
that allows sexual harassment to occur, only when that harassment 
 
 69. Id. at 26 (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984)). 
 70. See Fitzgerald, 504 F.3d at 179 (holding that Title IX precludes section 1983 claims) 
(citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009–11 (1984)) . 
 71. Brief Amici Curiae of the ACLU & NWLC, supra note 38, at 10. 
 72. Id. (citing Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 377 (1979); 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413–17 (1968); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 
421 U.S. 454, 457–61 (1975)). 
 73. Id. (quoting Great Am. Fed. Sav & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 377 (1979)). 
 74. Brief Amici Curiae of the ACLU & NWLC, supra note 38, at 18. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 65, at 21. 
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deprives victims of educational opportunities or benefits.77 The Equal 
Protection Clause, on the other hand, prevents schools from engaging 
in sex discrimination, even if the discrimination does not deprive the 
victim of educational opportunities or benefits.78 
Though the First Circuit would allow a plaintiff to bring 
concurrent Title IX and section 1983 constitutional claims when an 
individual defendant commits an “independent wrong, separate and 
apart from the wrong asserted against the educational institution,” it 
would not allow concurrent Title IX and section 1983 constitutional 
claims based on a single incident79 A plaintiff might have both a Title 
IX claim and an Equal Protection claim if, for example, a school 
demonstrates deliberate indifference to sexual harassment in a 
manner that deprives victims of educational opportunities and at the 
same time treats the sexual harassment of girls differently than it 
treats the sexual harassment of boys.80 If a plaintiff’s Title IX claim is 
unsuccessful, it should not deny the plaintiff the opportunity to 
prevail on an Equal Protection claim stemming from the same actions 
of the school. 
VI.  ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION 
A. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Fitzgeralds’ Case 
The primary strength of the Fitzgeralds’ case is that the private 
remedy offered by Title IX is judicially implied, and therefore may 
not reflect the intent of Congress to make Title IX an exclusive 
remedial scheme.81 Because the judicially implied remedy calls into 
question Congress’s intent, the Supreme Court may be reluctant to 
hold that Congress intended Title IX to preclude Equal Protection 
claims under section 1983. 
A secondary strength of the Fitzgeralds’ case is the fact that Title 
IX and the Equal Protection Clause do not protect identical rights, 
and therefore the First Circuit’s rationale would deny protection of 
constitutional rights in certain circumstances.82 This strengthens the 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 21–22. 
 79. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 180 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 80. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 65, at 22. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 21–22. 
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Fitzgeralds’ case because the Supreme Court might hesitate to make a 
decision that would deny the protection of constitutional rights. 
The primary weakness of the Fitzgeralds’ case is that the First 
Circuit attempted to narrow the impact of its decision by saying that 
Title IX would not preclude all section 1983 constitutional claims.83 If 
the First Circuit’s decision is interpreted narrowly, as applying only to 
the specific set of facts set forth in this case, then the Fitzgeralds 
cannot claim that this decision would have the effect of denying the 
protection of constitutional rights. Without such policy implications, 
the Fitzgeralds lose some of the force of their argument. 
Another weakness of the Fitzgeralds’ case is that, though they 
have asserted that their Equal Protection claim is distinct from their 
Title IX claim, they did not articulate this distinction before the 
district court or appellate court.84 The Fitzgeralds base their Equal 
Protection claim on the school’s different treatment of the male 
harasser and the female victim, but by not articulating this distinction 
in earlier proceedings they may have failed to preserve their Equal 
Protection claim for Supreme Court review.85 The Fitzgeralds argue, 
however, that because the section 1983 constitutional claim was 
dismissed by the district court before discovery could take place, they 
were not given the opportunity to demonstrate that their Title IX and 
section 1983 claims were distinct.86 
B. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Barnstable School Committee’s 
Case 
The primary strength of the School Committee’s case is that the 
First Circuit’s decision can be read narrowly so as not to preclude 
every section 1983 constitutional claim made concurrently with a Title 
IX claim.87 The potentially narrow nature of the decision allows the 
School Committee to assert that the First Circuit’s decision would not, 
 
 83. Fitzgerald, 504 F.3d at 180; Brief for Respondents Barnstable Sch. Comm. and Dr. 
Russell Dever at 3, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable, No. 07-1125 (U.S. May 5, 2008). 
 84. Brief for Respondents Barnstable Sch. Comm. and Dr. Russell Dever at 2, Fitzgerald v. 
Barnstable, No. 07-1125 (U.S. May 5, 2008). 
 85. Id.. 
 86. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 2–3, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable, No. 07-1125 (U.S. May 20, 
2008). 
 87. See Fitzgerald, 504 F.3d at 180 (“[W]hen a plaintiff alleges that an individual defendant 
is guilty of committing an independent wrong, separate and apart from the wrong asserted 
against the educational institution, a claim premised on that independent wrong would not be 
‘virtually identical’ to the main claim.”); Brief for Respondents, supra note 83, at 3 (same). 
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in fact, result in the denial of constitutional rights, and that therefore 
the Supreme Court should not hesitate to affirm the First Circuit’s 
decision. 
The primary weakness of the School Committee’s case is that the 
private right of action in Title IX is a judicially implied right, rather 
than a right expressly stated by Congress.88 The implied nature of this 
remedy both casts doubt on whether Congress intended Title IX to be 
an exclusive remedial scheme and weakens the analogy to the 
precedent set in Smith.89 
C. Likely Disposition 
The Supreme Court will likely hold that Title IX does not 
preclude section 1983 constitutional claims. Apart from Smith v. 
Robinson, the Supreme Court historically has demonstrated a 
reluctance to allow a later-enacted statute to preclude previously 
available constitutional remedies, and this case is distinct from Smith 
because neither the express language nor the history of Title IX 
indicates that Congress intended it to be an exclusive statutory 
remedy.90 Furthermore, if the Supreme Court were to hold that Title 
IX precludes constitutional claims based on section 1983, certain 
claims will no longer be available, leaving the constitutional 
grievances with no redress.91 
 
 
 88. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 65, at 22. 
 89. See id. (suggesting that because an implied remedy is construed by the judiciary rather 
than provided by Congress in the statute, it cannot indicate Congress’s intent to create a 
comprehensive remedial scheme). 
 90. Brief Amici Curiae of the ACLU & NWLC, supra note 38, at 10. 
 91. Two examples of claims that would have no remedy are when a discriminating state 
institution does not receive federal funding or when discriminatory behavior does not rise to the 
level of depriving victims of an education. Id. at 18. 
